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Trump the Peacemaker - Damian Kudryavtsev (Демьян Кудрявцев) - Medium

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Damian Kudryavtsev (Демьян Кудрявцев)

11/13/2024

Donald Trump’s triumphant return to the Oval Office, following his previous election defeat, investigations, trials, and even an assassination attempt, most closely resembles Napoleon’s return from Elba. To continue the metaphor, his primary goal during this term must be avoiding his own St. Helena. This will require not only decisively humiliating his opponents in courts and on the Hill but also demonstrating tangible achievements of his administration. Like his entire political persona, Trump’s campaign is built on inflating voter expectations to secure victory, but meeting such expectations will be challenging. Trump cannot afford a big mistake this time around, as he won’t have the luxury of another term to correct it. This isn’t just about Trump-the-president’s political legacy of challenging the establishment; it’s about protecting the freedom and well-being of Trump-the-businessman and private citizen.

While the underlying reasons for Trump’s victory are primarily domestic, it’s precisely within America that demonstrating quick policy results will be the most challenging. He faces significant opposition, but the main difficulty lies in natural inertia and the slow pace of social change resulting from expected economic and political reforms. Even with unprecedented support in both chambers, while Trump might quickly pass anti-immigration, tax, and regulatory legislation changes, measurable effects won’t be visible for at least two years under circumstances difficult to predict today. After the bitter pandemic experience, Trump will rely on something other than long-term forecasts — he needs publicly demonstrable results as quickly as possible. Therefore, foreign policy will become the main storyline of his first months in office.

While there are many reasons why the new phase of the Middle East conflict won’t bring Donald Trump quick laurels as a peacemaker — a topic that deserves separate analysis — this is a far more systemic and protracted conflict involving multiple parties unfamiliar and uncomfortable for Trump, compared to what he likely sees as a more straightforward Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which he will most probably tackle first.

In declaring his readiness and ability to stop the European war, Trump has never revealed his vision for a peaceful solution or concrete steps to achieve such a goal. Putin has also frequently changed his stated objectives for the “special operation” — authoritarian figures of this type generally possess greater freedom of action than more traditional Western European politicians constrained by laws, traditions, and propriety. But in this case, ambiguity has been elevated to a principle, which has become the starting position for upcoming negotiations. Let’s try to discern the contours of future agreements through this fog.

First, it’s crucial to understand that while traditional American mediation typically concludes with handshakes for cameras and historic treaty signings (e.g., Camp David and Oslo), current agreements, if reached, won’t be formalized in any comprehensive document — they might not even require a formal ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. Businessman Trump and Putin, who operate by unwritten rules, don’t need documents; they trust behind-the-scenes coordination of practical steps, leaving each side relative freedom of interpretation for their respective audiences. The absence of formal documentation can be justified by the fact that the negotiating parties are not legally in conflict, and Ukraine won’t publicly participate in negotiations — despite Zelenskyy’s growing authoritarianism, he still needs a public mandate for concessions, and there’s no consensus regarding the possibility or type of concessions in Ukraine today.

From Putin’s and Trump’s perspective, Ukraine’s compliance with its role in the coming ceasefire or delimitation would be guaranteed by Western countries stopping weapons supplies, a task for the new American administration and Orbán, with Hungary being EU president for three months starting in January, the month of Trump’s inauguration. In response, Russia would provide Trump with Putin’s verbal guarantees to refrain from advancing troops beyond today’s frontline, which would then gradually transform into a demarcation line. The parties’ rhetorical exercises are secondary here. Vladimir Putin would interpret the agreements domestically as recognition of Russian victory, while Donald Trump would frame it as taming the Russian dictator. The only relatively formal Putin condition — NATO non-membership — requires just another alliance statement and is essentially guaranteed by Russian troops’ presence in Ukraine.

This framework is a bit simplistic, making it desirable but barely feasible without additional conditions. Trump needs to demonstrate not only his ability to stop Putin but also to push him back — therefore, some Russian troops withdrawing in one direction, most likely in the Kharkiv region, would probably be part of the bargain. The transfer of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant under the control of international forces (effectively returning it to Ukraine) would look good, especially since Russia isn’t prepared to bear responsibility for its condition anyway. In response, Ukraine would likely withdraw troops from the Kursk region, a move Kyiv is certainly willing to make, particularly since Zelenskyy lacks the real capability to maintain such a foothold in the long term. Such exchanges of concessions might not be articulated as direct agreements between the warring parties but could appear as natural frontline fluctuations — Russia has experienced such retreats from the war’s first year.

The main bargaining point may be the partial lifting of anti-Russian sanctions. For Putin, this isn’t just a crucial symbolic gesture in his dialogue with the West and a major achievement to present domestically, but a real necessity. The resilience of the Russian economy, despite apocalyptic predictions from Western bureaucrats and Russian opposition figures — presented by Russian propaganda as a management miracle and proof of genuine strength — is actually finite. The extremely high refinancing rate, “Nabiullina’s bulwark,” now slows down growth rather than inflation, with business activity sustained mainly through government orders. The distribution of “military money” to the population, combined with limited goods and services supply against tightening isolationist measures and rhetoric, leads to predictable results — inflationary expectations, inter-elite conflict, and administrative arbitrariness. The Russian market is on the verge of a financial crisis, and while partial sanctions removal won’t solve all its problems, it will undoubtedly delay and dampen its most unpleasant manifestations.

In fact, the quality and effectiveness of adopted sanctions as a tool dissatisfies the West, too (as we detailed in our report “Non-Military Methods of Pressure on Russia”). They’ve essentially led to losses for many European industries, loss of markets and routes, Chinese advantage in several aspects, and forced consolidation of once pro-Western Russian business elites around Vladimir Putin. However, revising even mistaken and ineffective sanctions for Europe’s own benefit would seem to European bureaucracy an impossible admission of weakness, if not guilt. Therefore, such an informal negotiation process, for which the U.S. would bear responsibility anyway, would be the best point for their correction and partial removal. Moreover, lives saved by the ceasefire would serve as a public justification for such revision. Certainly, this wouldn’t mean complete sanctions removal — only a roadmap for gradual relief in certain sectors. Nobody will lift personal sanctions from officials, parliamentarians, military leaders, and propagandists, nor does Putin want their free movement worldwide and the associated reduction in their total financial and ideological dependence. This is about easing pressure in the oil, industrial, trade, and transport sectors. Some softening of mutual accusatory rhetoric between Russia and the West might occur, but even this isn’t necessary — nobody needs or politically benefits from genuine position convergence; internal PR trade-offs and minimizing financial losses are what matter.

This scheme lacks one crucial element — a lubricating component that autocrats believe makes any deal feasible. In a world where annexations and contributions have been replaced by “delimitation” and sanctions, additional motivations and compensations are essential. The main element of such motivation must be funds for Ukraine’s partial reconstruction, without which Kyiv’s leadership’s willingness to not resist this arrangement cannot be secured. For its part, Europe, having spent billions supporting Ukraine’s military effort, cannot quickly mobilize billions to support a peaceful Ukraine. Direct American aid would contradict Trump’s public position on domestic priorities. Private investment won’t flow into a country with significant occupied territory. However, money to support Ukraine exists — it’s the frozen assets of Russia’s central bank in Europe, which will now need to be unfrozen.

I’m deeply convinced that Vladimir Putin has internally long “written off” these assets as unrecoverable losses. In case of escalation, rejection of ceasefire, or war continuation, they wouldn’t return to be at his disposal anyway and would eventually be confiscated. Isn’t it better to turn a blind eye to their loss for the sake of declaring Russia’s “victory,” thus gaining additional rhetorical argument for claims about Western theft and acquisitiveness, which we hear increasingly often from the Russian president? The former head of St. Petersburg’s economic bloc in the early ’90s will view this loss as payment for geopolitical and domestic political gain. Everything has its price — he’s certain of this maxim. Thus, he’ll regard the lost Russian deposits as due payment for eastern Ukraine and that the West will accept this price. Notably, such decisions will be “made” and implemented by European bureaucrats, not Trump, with whom Putin can continue dialogue without losing face. European companies will organically become beneficiaries of this confiscation — they will be reconstructing Ukraine, mainly Polish and other Eastern European companies whose governments are most uncompromising toward the Russian regime. Ukrainian authorities will receive a new source for controlled distribution. Everyone will appear externally dissatisfied, but the wheels of a new post-war reality, lubricated by this money, will slowly begin turning.

Let me emphasize again that we’re discussing a realistic scheme for transitioning the conflict into a frozen phase following Trump’s rise to power, not a moral or strategic approach to geopolitical system confrontation. In solving this tactical task, Donald Trump doesn’t hope actually to change the world for the better; Vladimir Putin, conversely, expects that any temporary agreement today will become forcibly permanent for the West, especially if such a respite allows Russia to create additional pressure tools against the opposing side. Ukraine’s government will essentially shift the responsibility for unfeasible further resistance onto its allies’ greed and cowardice, The Kremlin will kindly allow Russian society to rejoice in liberation from the threat of a looming mobilization, and each conspiracy participant will tighten domestic political screws even further at home. True problem-solving will await the next political generation. Despite the apparent bleakness of such a prognosis, this scenario (among other realistic ones in the nearest political cycle) must be considered optimistic.

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cherjr
15 hours ago
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это все, конечно, хорошо и даже представимо, но без решения вопроса о гарантиях безопасности "оставшейся части" Украину придется ломать об колено, чтобы она на это пошла - а без этого всё сыпется
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Говори, детка, говори: почему намерения Трампа добиться снижения цен на нефть вряд...

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В ходе избирательной кампании в США энергетика занимала достаточно заметное место и в предвыборной риторике Трампа, и в выступлениях его соратников — в частности, в июльской публикации бывшего госсекретаря Майка Помпео в The Wall Street Journal. Мозговой центр Трампа, The America First Policy Institute (AFPI), чьи разработки, скорее всего, лягут в основу действий его администрации, тоже регулярно выступал по вопросам энергетической политики. Основные пункты программы достаточно предсказуемы для республиканского кандидата: меньше внимания «зеленой» и декарбонизационной повестке, больше — интересам бизнеса; фокус на дешевизне и экономической эффективности.

В рамках такого подхода обещано выдавать больше разрешений на разработку нефти и газа на землях, принадлежащих федеральному правительству, снять запрет на работы в Аляскинском заповеднике, разморозить разрешения на строительство трубопровода из Канады в Оклахому и строительство заводов по сжижению газа на побережье Мексиканского залива. Кроме того, предполагается значительно ослабить требования к автопроизводителям в отношении их портфеля продаж — при Байдене эти требования были ужесточены, что заставляло компании продавать определенное количество электромобилей, чтобы иметь возможность продавать обычные авто. То есть фактически эта мера заставляла производителей субсидировать продажи электромобилей за счет повышения цен на обычные машины.

Помимо этого, если верить Помпео, нефть предполагалось сделать элементом внешней политики — договориться с Саудовской Аравией, чтобы выжать Россию с мирового рынка нефти.

Приведет ли такая политика к радикальным изменениям в обозримой перспективе? Скорее всего, нет.

В действительности федеральное правительство имеет достаточно мало возможностей стимулировать нефтедобычу в США. В отличие от большинства стран мира, в США практически отсутствуют специальные налоги на добычу нефти, какие-либо аналоги российского НДПИ. Американское государство участвует в доходах от нефтедобычи через обычный универсальный налог на прибыль. В такой ситуации у правительства просто нет особого пространства для маневра, то есть нет той доли нефтяной выручки, которой можно поступиться в пользу нефтедобытчиков.

Что государство может делать — это выделять новые площади для сдачи в аренду под нефтедобычу. Ставки такой аренды довольно низкие, это плата скорее за землепользование, чем за эксплуатацию недр. Трамп обещает увеличить предложение участков, но ограниченность их количества не была проблемой и при Байдене. Американская сланцевая добыча достаточно уверенно росла, в основном компенсируя свое падение во время пандемии, когда цены на нефть были низкими. Но этот рост замедляется, так как наиболее продуктивные участки уже введены в разработку, а добыча на менее продуктивных при сохранении стоимости работ означает увеличение себестоимости, которая и без того дополнительно выросла в период высокой послековидной инфляции. 

От проекта трубопровода из Канады, проходящего по территориям, на которых начиналась добыча американской сланцевой нефти (Keystone XL), отказались уже три года назад и вряд ли к нему вернутся. Впрочем, центр добычи сланцевой нефти в США переместился в Техас и собственной инфраструктуры для нее уже хватает. К тому же особенного роста сланцевой добычи теперь не прогнозируется — может быть, еще миллион-полтора баррелей в день при условии сохранения цен выше $75 за баррель. А вот при падении цен ниже $60 за баррель прогнозируется снижение добычи на полтора-два миллиона баррелей в день на горизонте двух лет. Поэтому идея снизить цены на бензин для американских потребителей за счет роста нефтедобычи в США выглядит несколько утопично: тут уж одно из двух — либо низкие цены, либо рост добычи.

Столь же трудно реализуемой выглядит идея лишить Россию ее нефтяной выручки, договорившись с Саудовской Аравией о резком наращивании добычи. По мысли Помпео (про которого Трамп уже сказал, что не пригласит его в свой новый кабинет), при росте добычи и вызванном этим падении цен Россия будет вынуждена остановить добычу и уйти с нефтяного рынка, после чего Саудовская Аравия сможет насладиться им в в одиночестве (как, видимо, и высокими ценами).

Но, во-первых, Россия с ее текущей себестоимостью добычи и транспортировки, не превышающей $20 за баррель для основного объема добычи, так сразу добычу не остановит, а если и остановит, то так же быстро и нарастит, как только цены пойдут вверх. Во-вторых, для американских добытчиков эта ситуация будет куда болезненнее. Именно так дело и обстояло в 2020 году, когда Трамп угрозами лишить Саудовскую Аравию всех военных поставок принудил ее к переговорам с Россией на предмет организованного снижения добычи ради стабилизации рынка во время пандемии. Кроме того, следующий теоретический шаг в этой схеме — резкий рост цен, которым вроде и предполагалось заманить Саудовскую Аравию в игру, — будет неприятен для американских потребителей. В общем, в этом плане слишком много противоречий. 

Что теоретически можно было бы попробовать провернуть вместо неработающей схемы ценового потолка, так это убедиться, что дополнительной саудовской и выросшей американской добычи достаточно для замещения российской нефти, и затем попытаться объявить полное и всеобъемлющее эмбарго на закупки российской нефти для всех с угрозами вторичных санкций в случае нарушения. Но в таком сценарии баланс нефти в мире не сходится, российская нефть все равно понадобится, а рост цен в ходе этого эксперимента может загнать мировую экономику в очень тяжелый кризис.

Снятие байденовского моратория на выдачу разрешений для новых заводов СПГ может поменять ситуацию после 2028 года. На заводы, которые должны войти в строй в ближайшее время, этот мораторий не распространялся (когда он был введен, заводы уже строились). Ожидается, что в 2026–2027 годах в строй войдут мощности, обеспечивающие производство нескольких десятков миллионов тонн СПГ, однако в первые несколько лет их загрузка не будет превышать 70%. Даже если стараниями администрации Трампа появятся какие-то дополнительные заводы СПГ в ближайшие три года, это ничего не изменит: в этот период мощности производства СПГ не будут ограничивающим фактором. 

Пространство для маневра, которое здесь открывается, связано с российским газом. Когда новые мощности в США будут введены в строй и дополнительные объемы сжиженного газа пойдут на европейский рынок, появится возможность наложить санкции на «Ямал СПГ», равно как и отказаться от российского трубопроводного газа, поступающего сейчас в Центральную Европу. Это так и произойдет, если только до этого не будут заключены некие политические соглашения о сворачивании или смягчении санкционной войны в отношении России. 

Помимо планов наращивания добычи в США и ценовой войны с Россией, Трамп и его интеллектуалы настроены отказываться от международного сотрудничества в области ограничения выбросов парниковых газов и выходить из Парижского соглашения. Если США при этом отменят плату за выбросы углекислоты в атмосферу, американские товары, поставляемые в Европу, начиная с 2026 года должны будут обкладываться балансирующим налогом CBAM. В таком сценарии можно ожидать тарифной войны между Европой и США. Впрочем, учитывая предвыборные обещания Трампа замещать подоходный налог импортными пошлинами, такая война имеет высокие шансы развернуться в любом случае. 

Если европейский механизм CBAM сломается на противостоянии США, его будет крайне трудно применять в отношении товаров из других стран. Да и европейские производители начнут давить на органы ЕС, чтобы добиться послаблений экологических требований ради сохранения конкурентоспособности с остальным миром.

Любопытно, что в данный момент одним из крупнейших доноров кампании Трампа и его конфидентом является Илон Маск. Вроде бы антиэкологические взгляды Трампа и его команды должны идти вразрез и со взглядами, и с коммерческими интересами фабриканта — производителя электромобилей, солнечных панелей для зданий и батарей для хранения солнечной энергии. Как конкретно этот конфликт будет разрешаться, мы пока не знаем, но совершенно очевидно, что импорт китайских электромобилей в США подпадет под повышенные пошлины, что явно должно понравиться Маску.

Сколько из этих идей будет реализовано и в какой форме, сказать трудно: предвыборные обещания и лозунги вообще реализуются в не очень большой степени, а уж если речь идет о Трампе, так тем более. Он давно зарекомендовал себя хозяином своих слов — в смысле готовности взять их назад или просто не обращать внимания на когда-то обещанное. В предыдущую каденцию Трампу удалось совсем немногое из заявленного из-за противодействия Конгресса и правительства. В этот раз Трамп куда лучше контролирует Республиканскую партию и может рассчитывать на большее понимание конгрессменов. Уроки прошлого в противостоянии с «глубинным государством» тоже выучены, и команда Трампа много думала над тем, как заставить аппарат работать на президента, а не против него.

Наверное, можно ожидать некоторого увеличения американской нефтедобычи по отношению к тому, что было бы при Харрис, но отнюдь не революционного. Этот рост может быть абсорбирован внутренним американским спросом, сохраняющимся из-за более медленного, чем предполагалось, перехода на электромобили. Рост производства и экспорта СПГ будет весьма значительным, как и усилия по обеспечению рынка для этого газа, но так случилось бы при любом исходе выборов. Расширение экспортных возможностей может привести к некоторому подорожанию газа на внутриамериканском рынке, что создаст стимулы к развитию возобновляемой электроэнергетики (по крайней мере в некоторых штатах) безо всяких дополнительных усилий со стороны администрации Трампа. Глобальные усилия по выстраиванию институтов торговли квотами на углеродные выбросы, снижению выбросов и т.д. будут развиваться без участия США и, может быть, с некоторым американским противодействием, что сильно замедлит их развитие, но они и сейчас уже значительно слабее, чем были на пике в 2021 году.

В итоге некоторые нереволюционные изменения могут произойти на внутриамериканском рынке энергии, но они не окажут влияния на глобальный рынок. Наоборот, определенное влияние на него окажет ввод новых мощностей для производства СПГ, которые увеличат экспортные возможности США, но это никак не связано с идеями и предполагаемой политикой Трампа на этом направлении. А его возможные решения в этой сфере могут сказаться на ситуации лишь далеко за границами его президентского срока. Сделка с Саудовской Аравией маловероятна, потому что в результате терять долю рынка будет не только Россия, но и американские производители. Наконец, сценарий с вытеснением России с мирового рынка нефти с помощью эмбарго выглядит технически слишком сложным — относительно быстро заместить всю российскую нефть вряд ли возможно.

Так что энергетическая стратегия Трампа, скорее всего, останется в основном эпизодом предвыборной борьбы.

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Has Trump learnt from his mistakes?

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Has Trump learnt from his mistakes? He must break free from Beltway dogma

Take two (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Take two (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)


November 9, 2024   6 mins

Beyond his likely majority in both the Senate and the House, Trump’s real advantage over Trump’s last term is his last term. More experienced in the halls of power, and with a sharper sense of his own vision for America, the 47th President will not make the same mistakes as the 45th. That could have especially dramatic consequences abroad — Trump now knows who to appoint and how to operate in foreign capitals. No less important, the President-elect’s domestic agenda, encompassing everything from tariffs to manufacturing, should also progress more successfully under an older and wiser Trump. Combined with the vast cultural implications of his victory, Trump could remake those aspects of American public life most shaped by government.

Especially in the conduct of foreign policy, Trump 1.0 was happy to hire respected officials suggested by the establishment — but who nonetheless turned out to be totally wrong for him. One was General Mattis, his first Secretary of Defence. Mattis was a true warrior who in 1991 led the Marines to Baghdad in record time. But he also happened to be a Democrat, who fiercely resisted all of Trump’s policies and even tried to appoint Hillary’s candidate for the Pentagon as his own deputy. Trump had to replace him, at great political cost.

Another mistaken appointment was Rex Tillerson. Trump’s first Secretary of State, he came recommended by such establishment luminaries as Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates. Tillerson had spent his life in the tough and supremely realistic oil business. But as soon as he moved into his seventh floor office, he became enslaved by State Department dogma. One was that the US needed French and German approval for any plan to rebuild Nato, already depleted after years of under-funding. That inevitably ensured that nothing would be done: Berlin did not want to spend anything and Paris had nothing to spend.

The end result was Trump’s highly publicised quarrel with Angela Merkel, who patiently pointed out that war was utterly improbable in Europe, so that buying guns and ammunition would just be a waste of money. It goes without saying that elite opinion on both sides of the Atlantic backed the learned chancellor’s flawless logic, as against Trump’s boorish ranting. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we all now know that the President was right — and the policy elite wrong. A better Secretary of State could have advanced Trump’s policy much more effectively by activating Germany’s own military experts, bitterly aware of the sad state of their country’s military. They might also have lobbied the German press, setting the stage for a very different meeting with Merkel.

Beyond the question of appointments, the foreign policy challenges of his first term should have taught him two things. One: present the Europeans with ultimatums rather than just requests. Two: ignore State Department dogma on anything important. That second point is obvious enough after Trump’s first presidency. Consider, for instance, the plan Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner came up with to bring peace to the Middle East. Their idea was simple: they would ask their friends in Bahrain, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to open diplomatic relations with Israel.

Coming from a young businessman with no Middle East policy credentials, Kushner’s proposals were immediately dismissed as childish by Tillerson and his minders at the State Department. As they patiently explained, no Arab state could possibly agree to open diplomatic relations with Israel until the Palestine problem was solved, and any attempt to pursue such an absurd project could only end in refusals that were humiliating both for Trump and his country. But in the end, almost all accepted Kushner’s proposal. Only Saudi Arabia delayed, and even Riyadh immediately allowed Israeli airliners headed east to overfly its vast territories, at huge savings in time and fuel.

Given all this, Trump 2.0 will undoubtedly be guided in his foreign policy by his own closest supporters — rather than by any specious bureaucratic dogmas. That certainly applies to the Ukraine war, which cannot end unless Putin agrees to end it. Diplomatically, Trump will start with a significant advantage: unlike Biden, he never insulted Putin, and this would allow Putin to accept a compromise peace without being criticised as weak. I expect intense action soon after Trump’s inauguration.

“Trump 2.0 will undoubtedly be guided in his foreign policy by his own closest supporters — rather than by any specious bureaucratic dogmas.”

Not that conciliation can work with Iran. Knowing that his own Democratic party had a long tradition of military interventions, from Truman in Korea to LBJ in Vietnam, President Obama was determined to prevent war with Iran. His method was to embrace the Ayatollah’s regime, by offering it economic favours that greatly increased Tehran’s oil revenues. And this policy persisted even after it became obvious that the money was not being spent on the needs of Iran’s population, but was instead being funnelled to its nuclear programme and to proxy militias across the region.

When Trump assumed office in 2016, strict controls on Iran’s oil revenues sharply reduced the regime’s military expansion. But when Biden replaced Trump, Obama’s Iran policy was resumed; his exceptionally conciliatory Iran coordinator was back in action; and Tehran’s greatly increased oil revenues funded the multi-front war currently underway across the Middle East.

As it happens, one of Biden’s last moves was to send B-52 heavy bombers to the Middle East, in an attempt to deter any more Iranian ballistic missile attacks, fearing that Israel would react by destroying Iran’s export terminal on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf. Though Trump will certainly act immediately to squeeze Iranian revenues, if that is not enough those B-52s might well come in handy, notwithstanding the fact that Trump is an instinctive anti-interventionist.

Nor has Trump only learned foreign policy lessons since leaving the White House in 2021. He is also much better prepared to deal with his own party. Never a Republican until he ran for president, Trump now appreciates that today’s GOP is very different from the old cliche of country clubs, free trade and low taxes. Apart from anything else, the Republican establishment has stopped resisting state power across the economy and society. By 2023, after all, there were some 22 million civil servants at all levels of government, and even that understates the number of Americans who now live off the state, funded by grants from all manner of NGOs.

Whenever the Democratic Party controls a bureaucracy — from counties to the federal government — it expands it by granting public money to “nonprofits” that promise to improve public education, promote renewable energy or help the poor, among other good things — while being Democratic Party operatives. These NGOs also pay generous salaries to their executives: long before Michelle Obama became a “centimillionaire” after her eight White House years, she received a handsome paycheck from a hospital nonprofit in Chicago.

That’s how the Democratic Party pays for its manpower. Under Trump 2.0, the President’s officials will work hard to ensure that the Republicans in the House and Senate are rigorous in their scrutiny of every part of the federal budget, resisting the temptation to swap favours with the Democrats at the taxpayer’s expense.

No less important, this second Trump presidency will finally grapple with the question of domestic manufacturing. Under Trump 1.0, after all, the Republicans continued to demand free trade with China, which Trump opposed, and now opposes even more, because it enriches America’s chief geopolitical antagonist. Combined with the likely slashing of red tape — a phenomenon that afflicts every industry from Hawaii to Maine — this could yet spark a domestic manufacturing boom. That is surely needed: while the Japanese are able to build cheap and attractive kei cars with engines under 660cc, US manufacturers are forced to sell cars that can safely be driven at high speeds, even to customers who simply want to go shopping nearby. Not that deregulation will be limited to the American automotive sector. The oil and gas industry will doubtless benefit even more, while the aviation sector urgently needs aggressive anti-monopoly action to break up the somnolent Boeing and uncreative Lockheed.

In the end, though, Americans ultimately elected Trump to stop illegal migration. I am therefore confident that, by inauguration day in January, the administration will have presented a robust plan for the border. For starters, the right of asylum will be limited to those who really need protection from political or racial persecution, and who account for less than 1% of those who entered the US under Biden. The practice of airlifting thousands of monocultural illegal immigrants to small towns — notably the 1,500 Mauritanians who abruptly arrived in Lockland, Ohio — will end immediately. Why? Because illegal immigrants will immediately be sent back across the border as soon as they arrive. This was done effectively enough under Trump 1.0, and much has been learned since.

Beyond the policy arena, meanwhile, many Americans might plausibly suggest that no amount of legislation can capture the real meaning of Trump’s victory: the country’s verdict on everything from political prosecutions and critical race theory to its biased media and the unashamed moral bankruptcy of its entertainment industry. What’s clear enough, at any rate, is that Americans crave something different, and as he enters the White House for the second time, Donald Trump can offer just that.


Professor Edward Luttwak is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.

ELuttwak

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История дня по итогам голосования за 08 ноября 2024

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В детстве оживила свою собаку с помощью искусственного дыхания. Настолько этим вдохновилась, что теперь я врач-реаниматолог. Спасаю жизни людей, работаю до потери пульса. Знаю, что это моё призвание.
Только недавно мама призналась, что собака просто спала.
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Democrats, Blame Yourselves

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bogorad
5 days ago
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Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain
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История дня по итогам голосования за 07 ноября 2024

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Захожу в обувной магазин. Ко мне подходит продавщица азиатской внешности. Cпрашиваю:
- Кроссовки фирмы "такой-то" у вас встречаются?
Она немного зависла, потом ответила:
- Не только встречаются, но и заводят пары.
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